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Revisiting the Effect of Country Size on Taxation in 
Developing Countries 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In developed and developing countries, taxation makes up a significant part of 
government‟s current total revenue.  Tax efficiency is important in order to maximize 
revenue that can be used in the redistribution of wealth and public expenditure.  Larger 
economies, however, experience difficulties in remaining efficient.  This study, therefore, 
seeks to investigate the effect country size has on tax revenues for developing countries 
and to discuss whether the findings of Codrington (1989) in the 1980s still hold in the 
twenty-first century.  Analytical and empirical methodologies were conducted using a 
total of thirty-four countries.  Conflicting results were found.  Analytically, size played a 
discriminating role with respect to utilization of the tax systems as 72.6 percent were 
employed by maxi-states while 59.7 percent were adopted by small economies.  Micro 
economies were heavily reliant on international trade and transaction taxes.  Empirically, 
population positively influenced tax-to-GDP ratios while openness was statistically 
insignificant. 
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Introduction 
Since the great debate on European economic integration in the mid-1950s, economists 
have been captivated by the study of economics of size.  Researchers have initially 
attempted to determine the relationship between size and development. However, over 
the years, studies have shifted towards investigating the impact of size on key 
macroeconomic variables.  In this era of globalization it is important to understand the 
relationship between size and the economy as small economies and increasingly, very 
large nations are progressively becoming susceptible to the demands from the economic 
powerhouses of the world.  Very few studies, however, have focused on taxation.  
Though taxation can be seen as a disincentive to work, it is an essential part of the 
economy as it helps in the redistribution of income and to finance public expenditures 
that are necessary for further development. 
 
Researchers have long emphasized that small economies rely heavily on taxation because 
of the many disadvantages that plaque their structural economies such as diseconomies of 
scale, lack of diversification due to limited natural resources and macroeconomic policy 
autonomy.  Therefore, ensuring prudent fiscal management is of utmost importance for 
maintaining a stable economy.  Nonetheless, many economists believe that microstates 
are capable of withstanding these negative characteristics as their social and political 
environment allows for efficiency in taxation.  Though small size has been seen to 
dismiss many fallacies in relation to development, for example, Switzerland and 
Luxembourg, developing countries are still fighting a continuous battle to remain 
competitive in this industrializing world. 
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Consequently, like Codrington (1989), this paper seeks to examine the effect of country 
size on tax revenues for developing countries and to discuss whether his findings for the 
1980s are still applicable in the twenty-first century.  Codrington (1989) investigated the 
relationship between size and taxation in very small (mini-states) and very large (maxi-
states) countries for the period 1980 to 1984 employing three indicators of size – 
population, land area and national output - and three core fiscal indicators: the choice of 
tax instruments, the distribution of tax revenues, and the ratio of tax to GDP.  His 
findings illustrated that large countries employed a greater percentage of available taxes 
than very small countries.  The weight of taxes placed on functional categories also 
displayed notable disparity as large states focused more on income, social security, 
property and employment taxes, while mini-states placed greater emphasis on foreign 
trade taxation.  In addition, mini-states were found to be more efficient in the collection 
of taxes and to have a larger tax-GDP ratio.  Size was the only variable identified that 
explained this difference.  
 
Also addressed in the study are the policy implications and necessary recommendations.  
To this purpose, analytical and empirical investigations are carried out for a total of 34 
countries.  The analytical analysis looks at different ratios, in particular, tax-to-GDP and 
tax concentration as in Codrington (1989).  However, since most of the data appear non-
stationary in nature an unbalanced non-stationary panel data methodology is adopted for 
the empirical approach.  This is an advancement on Codrington (1989) who assumed the 
data were stationary, leading to the possibility of biased estimates and unreliable 
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inference.  The findings from this paper are important for policy makers when reforming 
the tax systems.  Additionally, the results can be used as a further basis to explain 
variations in the macroeconomics among countries. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Immediately following this section 
is a description of the literature for measuring country size.  Section 3 presents the 
literature review for the effect of size on taxation while section 4 discusses the data and 
methodology employed.  Section 5 provides an analysis of the analytical and empirical 
results for the study.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Measurement of Size 
Over the years, there has been much debate by researchers to establish a criterion that can 
group countries into different sizes.  One accepted methodology is to adopt a continuous 
rather than a discrete concept (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2007).  Two methods have 
been predominantly identified in the literature: behavioral and quantitative. 
 
Demas (1965), Selwyn (1980), Coulson (1982), Diggines (1985) and recently Briguglio 
(1995, 2002) are examples of studies that undertook theoretical analyses to classify 
countries based on common characteristics observed.  Selwyn (1980) identified that 
microstates are heavily dependent on foreign trade, one large foreign company and have a 
specialized economy due to a narrow range of resources.  Briguglio (1995, 2002) added 
that smallness is associated with a “price taker” economy that results from the inability to 
influence international prices.  However, the Commonwealth Secretariat (2007) noted 
 6 
that this characteristic is not a sufficient tool since it can also be applied to large 
countries.  Nonetheless, one feature that wholly captivates researchers is that small states 
are predominantly vulnerable whether politically, economically, technically, socially and 
culturally (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2007; Liou and Ding, 2002; Armstrong et al., 
1998; Briguglio, 1995).  However, it should be noted that studies have found that larger 
countries have also developed this characteristic (see www.fundforpeace.org).  Therefore, 
since there is no accepted behavioral basis to categorize countries, researchers have 
placed greater emphasis on quantitative methodologies. 
 
To quantitatively measure country size, three variables are commonly used: population, 
land area, and economic performance, usually proxied by gross domestic product (GDP).  
Studies have utilized cluster analysis and principal components techniques to compute an 
index that involves all three of the above variables [see Crowards (2002) and Downes 
(1988, 1990)].  So far, population has been the most favored amongst studies [see 
Kuznets (1960), Chenery and Syrquin (1975), Armstrong et al. (1998), Liou and Ding 
(2002) and Rose (2006)].  Read (2001) argued that population is the best method to 
measure size because of information content and ease of conceptualization while the 
Commonwealth Secretariat (2007, p.22) conveyed that population size is „intuitively 
appealing from an economic point of view as it reflects the size of the labor force and 
therefore the constraints associated with human resources and the potential number of 
consumers.‟  Furthermore, population is based on the suppliers and the buyers of goods 
and services produced, thus, it is most appropriate as a measure of size.  To this note, in 
the empirical investigation below, population is employed as a measure of country size.   
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Some economists believe that the sole use of geographical area (Jalan, 1982; Lloyd and 
Sundrum, 1982) or economic performance or GDP (Read, 2001) provides misleading 
measures of economic size.  Srinivasan (1986) also noted that GDP is more dependent on 
the level of development than size.  It is therefore common to see two or more of these 
variables being utilized together (Demas, 1965; Downes, 1988, 1990; Codrington,  1989; 
Crowards, 2002).  Downes (1988) noted that the three measures are interrelated by way 
of population density, per capita income and spatial per capita income, which is a proxy 
for the regional dispersion of per capita income.  Thus, using all variables would provide 
a better indication of size.  
 
Besides recognizing the variables to determine country size, further analysis is needed to 
establish a cut-off limit that would distinguish a small country from a medium or large 
one.  Armstrong et al. (1998), after searching for a natural break in the population size 
continuum, identified an upper limit of 3 million persons for a microstate.  The paper 
defined microstate as those entities with an unusual degree of autonomy within a larger 
country.  Taylor (1969) used a mean population level of 18 million to differentiate 
between large and small countries while Jalan (1982) suggested an upper limit of 5 
million people for a small state.  Demas (1965) also agreed that a small country should 
have a population of less than 5 million in addition to usable land area of at most 20 
thousand square miles. 
 
Crowards (2002) categorized 190 countries according to population, land area and total 
income.  Two methodologies were adopted: observation of continuum to identify 
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significant breaks and cluster analysis.  From the observational analysis the study found 
that there are five groups for country size – micro, small, medium-small, medium-large 
and large.  A micro country was observed to have a population below 0.5 million, a land 
area of 7, 000 km
2
 and income at no more than US$0.7 billion while for a large nation the 
continuum breaks indicated that there should be no less than 12 million people, 250,000 
km
2
 in land area and have at least US$12 billion.
2
  The cut-off levels for the study were 
consistent with other research such as Armstrong et al. (1998) and Kuznets (1960).  The 
findings obtained by Crowards were employed as the basis for ranking countries in this 
paper.  From the continuums, cut-off levels were identified for maxi-states; the lower 
limits were 19 billion people, 300 km
2
, and US$25 billion.  However, it should be taken 
into account that there is no clear-cut method of determining the number of clusters in 
hierarchical classifications procedure or cut-off levels since they are based on subjective 
analysis (Downes, 1990).  As such, there is no absolute hard and fast rule to distinguish 
between a big and small country. 
 
3.  Literature Review  
Bray (1987) noted that the study of country size and its impact on the economy gained 
popularity, following the Second World War, due to the growth in the number of 
independent, small states.  Researchers have been studying the effect of size on the 
taxable capacity of an economy since the 1970s.  More recently, related studies have 
investigated the influence size has on tax competition, tax harmonization, and on 
macroeconomic variables such as economic growth, trade, and economic volatility.  
                                               
2 Since micro-states and maxi-states are of interest in this study only these results are provided, see 
Crowards (2002) for a wider discussion. 
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Three approaches have been utilized to analyze these relationships: theoretical, empirical 
and analytical.  Because very few papers have significantly addressed the issue of size 
and taxation for developing countries, the literature review will comprise mainly of an 
evaluation of the methodology and results of Tait et al (1979) and Codrington (1989).  
Brief discussions of associated papers are given.  
 
Country Size and Taxation 
Tait et al. (1979) sought to examine the relationship between taxable capacity and the 
ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, the share of mining in GDP, the share of agriculture 
in GDP, export ratio, export ratio excluding mining, per capita non-export income and 
per capita GDP, and compared the extent of the variation among countries with dissimilar 
economic characteristics.  The study considered 63 developing countries with per capita 
gross national product (GNP)) less than US$1000.  Regressions were run for subsamples 
of countries based on population, national income, and per capita GNP; and then 
compared to that of the larger sample.  The paper found that national income affects 
taxable capacity in small countries, but is irrelevant for larger countries.  The results 
supported the hypothesis that mining and foreign trade matter relatively more for the 
countries with lower per capita GNP (between US$0 and US$500).  Additionally, the 
estimates showed no significant relationship between population and countries with high 
and low densities.  The researchers also tested for the effect of geography on taxable 
capacity.  In Africa, agriculture was found to influence capacity, while in Asia and Latin 
America external trade was a more significant determinant.  Moreover, the study posits 
that regrouping international tax comparison indices by subgroups for size of country, per 
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capita income, population, and geographical area did not add significantly to an 
understanding of the relationship. 
 
Codrington (1989) investigated the relationship between size and taxation in developing 
countries for the period 1980 to 1984.  Adopting Thomas (1974) methodology, three 
indicators – population, land area and national output - were used in order to determine 
the criteria for size.  The developing economies were categorized into very small (mini-
states) and very large (maxi-states) countries.  Based on a theoretical examination, 
Codrington made comparisons between the two groups using three core fiscal indicators: 
the choice of tax instruments, the distribution of tax revenues, and the ratio of tax to 
GDP.  His findings illustrated significant differences between the two country size 
groups.  Large countries employed a greater percentage of available taxes than very small 
countries (44percent as compared to 41percent).  The weight of taxes placed on 
functional categories also displayed notable disparity as large states focused more on 
income, social security, property and employment taxes, while mini-states placed greater 
emphasis on foreign trade taxation.  The latter result was consistent with Tait et al. 
(1979).  Evidence suggested that nearly 84percent of tax revenue in large countries was 
derived from three tax groups, but only two was utilized for very small countries, 
implying that mini-states are more efficient in the collection of taxes.  Small countries 
were also found to have a larger tax-GDP ratio.  Size was the only variable identified that 
explained this difference, for it has implications on tax effort as economic structures, 
social organization, administration and government activities are affected. 
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Ohsawa (1999) demonstrated the important role that country size and location play in tax 
competition using Nash games.  Although tax competition is globally inefficient, owing 
to the imbalance in the burden of tax competition, the study found that small countries 
could still benefit, as tax rates are higher in larger countries. Therefore, the small country 
achieves higher per capita revenue in the Nash equilibrium relative to the large country.  
Similar results were also found in Ohsawa (2003), Trandel (1994), Kanbur and Keen 
(1993), Wilson (1991) and Bucovetsky (1991).  In contrast, Haufler and Wooton (1999) 
noted that imperfect competition with trade barriers could reverse the benefit for small 
countries.  Considering two countries competing for a monopolist to invest in their 
economy, they showed that even if the larger country ends up imposing higher taxes, it, 
nonetheless, wins due to better market access, since trade costs provides a location 
advantage.  Such findings can have implications for increased tax revenues as 
governments may receive greater corporation tax. 
 
Size and Country Performance Indicators 
The literature on the analysis of size on macroeconomic indicators is important to this 
study because the effect of country size on macro-variables can give an indication of the 
performance level of a nation, in addition to the necessary implications on the collection 
of tax revenue. 
 
Keesing (1968) tested for the size effect, using a cross-section analysis of 31 countries, in 
regard to 40 commodity categories.  Evidence supported the hypotheses that the size 
effect gives rise to a positive correlation between per capita exports and population, but a 
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negative correlation between per capita imports and population.  Small countries were 
therefore at a disadvantage in the international trade of manufactured goods because their 
limited national markets restricted the possibilities of exploiting internal and external 
economies. 
 
Balassa (1969) criticized Keesing‟s methodology and findings.  He suggested reasons, 
other than country size, for the hypotheses given in the paper.  Specializing, in a few 
export products, was identified as one reason to explain the first hypothesis since some of 
these countries will export only one commodity.  The reason given for the second 
hypothesis was that specialization requires high importation that contributes to the 
negative correlation.  He indicated that the use of individual product categories for the 
dependent variable (per capita exports and imports) is not sufficient to determine “size 
effect” and “income effect”. Instead, he recommends the consideration of all 
manufactured goods.  Balassa reformulated the regressions by taking the share of the 
exports (imports) of manufactured goods in total exports (imports) as the dependent 
variable.  The results indicated the presence of size effect with regard to exports and 
imports in both country groups.  Small countries were found to be at a disadvantage in 
the international trade of manufactured goods.  He added, however, that small countries 
would gain more from trade liberalization and regional integration.  After taking into 
consideration the heterogeneity in the manufacturing sector, Balassa separated the sector 
into semi-manufactures and finished manufactures. He found that small countries had a 
comparative advantage in exporting semi-manufactures but were disadvantaged in 
exporting finished goods.  
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Khalaf (1979), using a multiple correlation analysis, examined the effect of country size 
on both economic growth and economic development. The study found no evidence of 
country size being associated with either growth or development. There was also an 
unclear impact of dependence on trade, commodity export concentration, and geographic 
export concentration on growth and development. 
 
Amiti (1998) assessed the relationship between the size of a country and the 
characteristics of the goods it produces and trades.  A general equilibrium model was 
adopted to test the hypotheses that the „market access‟ effect attracts firms to the large 
country to save on transportation costs; and the „production cost‟ effect attracts firms to 
the small country due to lower wages.  The study was conducted with the assumption that 
countries are the same in every respect besides size, but the industries were allowed to 
differ in factor intensities, transport costs and demand elasticities.  Amiti (1998) found 
that capital easily flowed to the large country when industries are allowed to vary their 
factor intensities.  When a variation in transport costs was allowed the large country 
traded its high transport cost goods for the small country low transport cost goods. Both 
countries benefited from increased economic activity that may result in higher tax ratios. 
 
Down (2007) tested the economic theory that smaller countries should experience greater 
levels of volatility than larger economies, on account of higher levels of insecurity.  
Evidence suggests that the level of domestic economic volatility in the developed 
economies during the latter half of the twentieth century may indeed have been driven by 
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the size and depth of markets.  Therefore, international trade integration may have eased 
rather than accentuated domestic economic volatility.   
 
In general, the literature for size on taxation provides inconclusive evidence to support 
either large or small countries completely benefiting from higher tax revenues and tax 
ratios.  Lotz and Morss (1967), Chelliah et al. (1975), and Tanzi and Shome (1993) 
identified other factors that might be responsible for a country‟s taxable capacity: the 
level of openness, per capita income, social attitudes, and political factors.  
 
4.  Methodology, Model Specification and Data 
Methodology and Model Specification 
 
To conduct an analysis of the effect of country size on taxation, the study adopted three 
criteria to determine the magnitude of a country: land area, population, and GDP.  The 
economies were separated into five different categories: micro, small, medium, large, and 
very large.  Despite findings and recommendations from earlier studies, the cut-off values 
for each group were taken from Crowards (2002).  These values were used because they 
provided the most recent analysis of the three criterions, as over the years, due to 
globalization and shocks to the economy, the population and gross domestic product 
figures for the countries would have been significantly altered.  The study focuses mainly 
on microstates and very large nations.   
 
To rank countries into different groups, all three criterions were given the same 
weighting.  A nation was identified as a microstate (or mini-state) if at least two 
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categories satisfied the microstate characteristics and the third category is at most small.  
For example, Antigua and Barbuda was a microstate with respect to land area and 
population but was considered a small country in terms of GDP; however, overall the 
country was labeled micro. Analogously, to determine a very large country, at least two 
of the criteria must be very large while the other falls under large.  Cameroon provides an 
ideal example.  The results are presented in Table 1. 
 
After categorizing the data, the study first investigated the relationship between country 
size and taxation using an analytical approach.  Similar to Codrington (1989), the 
indicators used were: the choice of tax instruments, the distribution of tax revenue, and 
the ratio of tax-to-GDP.  The results are presented in Tables 2A, 2B and 2C. 
 
The final procedure embarked upon in this paper was to empirically test for the effect of 
size on taxation.  A panel data model as specified below was adopted.  
TAXit = 1 + i x’it+it 
where x‟it = [POP, CS, IS, Ypc, OP] where TAX is the ratio of tax revenue to current GDP, 
POP is population, CS is consumption share of current GDP, IS is investment share of 
current GDP,  Ypc is gross domestic product per capita, and OP is openness in current 
prices.  i = 1,…,N countries over t = 1,…,T time periods and it = it + it, where it is the 
composite error term, it is the combined time-series and cross-section error component 
and it is the cross-section or individual-specific error component.   
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In this study, the a priori for Ypc on taxation is positive.  An increase in per capita income 
pushes individuals into a higher tax bracket and also stimulates more consumption.  
These are two important avenues where governments receive tax revenues.  Positive-
signed coefficients are also expected for CS and IS since they are directly related to GDP 
through the National Income Identity.  Population (POP), however, has an ambiguous 
relationship with tax-to-GDP ratio.  An indirect relationship may exist as the 
management of tax systems becomes easier with fewer taxpayers thus, increasing 
efficiency [Shenfield (1968), and Tanzi and Shome (1993)] while a positive-signed 
coefficient is possible as the greater the number of taxpayers the more tax-revenues 
collected.  The impact of openness, OP, on tax revenue is also ambiguous.  Trade 
liberalization, through a reduction in import duties, could encourage more imports that 
compensate the decline in the tax rate if the price elasticity is greater than one thus, 
resulting in an increase in trade taxes [Tanzi (1989) and Bovenberg (1987)].  On the other 
hand, an inverse relationship is possible if the price elasticity is equal to one or less.  
Calvo (1988) findings lent support to a negative-signed coefficient.  Therefore, price 
elasticity is an important factor in determining the impact of openness on taxation. 
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To estimate the coefficients, the study used recent developments in panel unit root and 
co-integration analysis.  Five major unit root tests were employed: Levin, Lin and Chu 
(LLC) (2002), and Breitung (2002) [which have a common unit root process as their null 
hypothesis], Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) (2002), the Augmented Dickey Fuller - Fisher 
Chi-square (ADFF) [which have individual unit root processes] and the Hadri z-statistic 
which has a null hypothesis of no unit root.  The results are shown in Table 3A. 
 
In the event of non-stationarity, Pedroni Panel Co-integration test (1999, 2000) was 
implemented (See Table 3B).  Due to different orders of integration found in the series, 
the Panel Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) procedure proposed by Kao and 
Chiang (2000) and Mark and Sul (2003) was adopted.  Therefore, the following model 
was regressed: 
LTAXit = 1 + i x’it+ i ∆xit + it 
where ∆x denotes lags and leads of the changes in LPOP, LIS, and LYpc.  In this method, 
lags and leads were included in each equation for the first difference of I(1) variables to 
correct for possible autocorrelation and endogeneity.  Two lags and leads were employed 
as annual data was used.  A general-to-specific reduction process was undertaken where 
only significant variables were retained.  White cross-section is included in the estimation 
to account for cross-equation correlation.  It should be noted that similar results were 
found for longer lags and leads.  The findings of the significant variables are reported in 
Table 3C. To save space the leads and lags are omitted from the table. 
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Data 
The listing of the developing countries was based on the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)‟s definition and was obtained from the World Economic Outlook Report for April 
2008.  In order to measure country size, 2007 figures for GDP, population and land area 
were used.  These data were procured from the IMF, the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) World Factbook, and the United Nations‟ World Population Prospects, 
respectively. 
 
To conduct the empirical investigations, the following variables, were considered: ratio 
of tax revenue to GDP (TAX), gross domestic product (Y), population (POP), 
consumption share of current GDP (CS), investment share of current GDP (IS) and 
openness in current prices (OP).  All variables were expressed in logarithm form and 
reported in nominal values.  Thirty-four cross-sections, representing all five country-
sizes, were included.  The time period considered ranged between 1962 and 2007.  A 
total of 3,420 observations were therefore used in the study. 
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Due to the lack or unavailability of statistics, annual data were obtained from various 
sources and were unbalanced among the countries.  Taxation data for the six Caribbean 
countries were retrieved from the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank while data for the 
other countries were obtained from various sources of the Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook of the IMF.  All other variables were sourced from the Penn World Tables 6.2.  
Robustness checks were carried out to ensure consistency in the data.   
 
5.  Results 
Analytical Results 
After examining the choice of tax instruments by the two groups, the results shown in 
Tables 2A, 2B and 2C indicate similar findings to Codrington (1989), with both country 
groups utilizing more of the tax systems.  The available statistics showed that on average 
72.6 percent of maxi-states employed the tax system while 59.7 percent were adopted by 
very small economies.  Each tax classification under the Government Finance Statistic 
(GFS) system were implemented by the very large countries, small economies, however, 
did not employ taxes on payroll and workforce, profits of fiscal monopolies, profits of 
export or import monopolies and exchange profits. 
 
There was no significant difference for taxes on income, profit and capital gains (IPC) as 
the tax seemed popular between both country groups (91.7 percent for mini-states and 
100 percent for maxi-states).  However, compared to the 1980s, very large countries have 
implemented more of the specific taxes than the microstates while micro economies 
significantly reduced the use of unallocated taxes.  The results also suggested that 
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microstates reduced miscellaneous taxes and focused more on taxing areas that generated 
more revenue such as company profits, thus, moving towards more effective taxes. 
 
The usage of property taxes was generally the same for maxi-states but surged for mini-
states.  Additionally, micro economies intensified the implementation of general taxes on 
goods and services by almost two fold.  Large countries fully employed excise taxes 
while taxes on specific services and taxes on use of or permission to use goods were more 
popular with very small economies.  There was positive utilization of miscellaneous taxes 
for very small countries compared to the non-use found in the 1980s.  This increase may 
have offset the fall-off in taxes on specific services.   
 
All countries in the sample exploited international taxes.  Larger countries were found to 
use more of the sub-categories than smaller economies.  Profits of export or import 
monopolies and exchange profits, however, are still unfavorable with microstates.  This is 
expected as mini-states have small domestic markets that make it difficult to extract 
revenue from these sources.  Instead, governments provide incentives through tax 
concessions to large firms in order to encourage them to invest locally.  An example is 
Grenada‟s Fiscal Incentives Act 1974. 
 
The results indicated that both country groups utilized more of the tax systems that 
indicated an attempt to generate higher tax revenues.  However, maxi-states tended to 
employ more taxes than mini-states.  This is likely because large countries have more 
complicated economies that allows for greater flexibility for developing and 
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implementing other taxes.  Therefore, overall maxi-states can be seen as having a more 
buoyant tax system. 
 
Table 2B shows the results of the tax-to-GDP ratios.  On average, tax revenues for 
microstates made up 24.1 percent of their GDP, which was significantly higher than the 
10.6 percent average for maxi-states.  Mini-states was also found to have a higher tax-to-
GDP ratio interval for individual countries than very large economies.  Comoros had the 
lowest ratio of 11.6 percent among the sampled microstates.  For maxi-states, the tax-
GDP ratio ranged between 6 and 30 percent with the lowest ratio being that of Iran.  This 
shows that despite the level of development, small economies still performed better in 
collecting tax revenues than large nations.  Generally, the tax-GDP ratios performed 
better for the microstates indicating that tax revenues made up a significant portion of 
their gross domestic product.  Consequently, mini-states are more efficient in the 
collection of tax revenues.  Therefore, governments should place greater emphasis on 
taxation since it is necessary for the growth and development of the economy through 
public expenditure. 
 
The results from the functional classifications illustrated no major differences from 
earlier studies.  They lend support to the stylized fact that small vulnerable states have 
high dependence on international trade for most of their tax revenues.  On the other hand, 
very large states were seen to depend mainly on taxes from IPC, and goods and services 
that comprised 7.3 percent and 8.1 percent, respectively.  Regardless of size, property 
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taxes, payroll and workforce taxes, and miscellaneous taxes continues to insignificantly 
contribute to developing countries GDP. 
 
The results for tax concentration ratios also showed that the sampled countries focused 
tax revenues on three main areas: IPC, goods and services and international trade and 
transactions.  The Gini-Hirschman coefficient indicated that small countries concentrated 
mainly on international trade as nearly 60 percent of tax revenue was obtained from this 
source whereas maxi-states needed to implement two or more tax groups to obtain the 
same revenue.  Therefore, the findings by Codrington are still applicable in the twenty-
first century.  This may be due to the diverse sectors found mainly in large economies. 
 
Consequently, although maxi-states utilized international trade and transaction taxes 
more than mini-states, the results showed that micro economies have a higher percentage 
of trade taxes to GDP and, thus, a higher concentration ratio.  Overall, mini-states are 
more tax efficient than large countries with regards to collecting taxes. 
 
Empirical Results 
Overall, the unit root tests indicated mixed orders of integration for the variables.  LTAX, 
LCS and LOP were stationary in levels while LPOP, LIS, and LYpc were non-stationary 
[I(1)].  The Pedroni co-integration test conveyed the presence of at least one co-
integrating vector.  Therefore, the results for the Panel DOLS estimation are presented 
next. 
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As shown in Table 3C, LPOP, LCS, LIS, and LYpc, were statistically significant in 
determining tax capacity for developing countries.  The findings and analyses for size on 
taxation are presented first.  A positive coefficient of 0.538 was found for LPOP.  This 
indicates that when population increases by 1000 persons, the tax-to-GDP ratio rises by 
US$538 million.  Though this result is inconsistent with Codrington (1989), and Tait et al 
(1979), it is plausible as a larger population results in a greater workforce that brings 
about more personal incomes and additional consumption on goods and services.  
Furthermore, an expansion in the population size can benefit very large nations because 
of foreign direct investments (FDI) as firms have greater incentives to invest due to the 
large market size that may guarantee more sales.  These are all areas in which 
governments can accumulate extra tax revenues.  This result is consistent with the 
developed countries as bigger states have higher tax capacities than small nations. 
 
Per capita income, another measure for country size, has a negative effect on tax-
revenue-to-GDP ratio (-1.003).  The result was unexpected as one anticipated a rise in 
GDP or economic activity to bring about higher tax revenues.  To account for the overall 
negative relationship, one can attribute the recent trends in taxation, that is, the shift away 
from personal income taxes towards consumption taxes [Atkinson (1981)].  By this 
change, the effect of per capita income is reduced as more taxes are collected from goods 
and services.   
As noted in Lotz and Morss (1967), sectoral compositions of an economy are positively 
correlated with tax-to-GDP ratios.  Therefore, as anticipated, LCS and LIS had significant 
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coefficients of 0.531 and 0.287, respectively.  The move towards indirect taxation could 
explain why the effect of LCS on tax capacity was greater than the impact of LIS.   
 
The findings for openness were found to be statistically insignificant thus, suggesting that 
international trade does not assist in the collection of tax revenues.  This result was 
unexpected as earlier studies showed the importance of international trade for micro 
economies to achieve acceptable levels of taxable capacity.  To explain why microstates 
still had higher tax-to-GDP ratios, one can point at other factors such as political 
conditions and low levels of corruption since most of the small, sampled-countries have a 
history of political and economic stability [Imam and Jacobs (2007)].  
 
Consequently, both the analytical and the empirical results were more or less consistent 
with earlier findings.  The paper found that size does indeed play a significant role in 
determining taxation.  However, despite the fact that small states had higher tax ratios 
and concentrated on taxes from international trade, the result of the empirical analysis 
showed that international trade was not responsible for these ratios.  This, therefore, leads 
one to conclude that a more efficient tax system is responsible for micro-economies‟ 
performance over maxi-states. 
 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In developing countries, taxation makes up a significant part of government‟s current 
total revenue.  It is of paramount importance for the redistribution of wealth and for 
public expenditure.  Therefore, economists advocate maximizing tax revenues through 
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tax efficiency.  Larger economies, however, may experience difficulties in remaining 
efficient as they have various sectors to control as well as monitor the many taxpayers.  
This study, therefore, sought to investigate the effect country size has on tax revenues for 
developing countries and to discuss whether the findings of Codrington (1989) in the 
1980s still hold in the twenty-first century.  Analytical and empirical methodologies were 
conducted using a total of thirty-four countries.  When compared with findings from 
previous authors similar results were found in the analytical section while the empirical 
approach showed inconsistencies.  The main findings and implications for these nations 
are summarized below. 
 
From the analytical results, size played a discriminating role with respect to utilization of 
the tax systems as 72.6 percent were employed by maxi-states while 59.7 percent were 
adopted by small economies.  Nonetheless, the study found that taxes on income, profit 
and capital gains (IPC), and international trade taxes were popular between both groups 
with no significant differences in their utilization.  On average, microstates had 
significantly higher tax-to-GDP ratios than maxi-states, 24.1 percent compared to 10.6 
percent.  Evidence supported the conclusion that large states were dependent on taxes 
from IPC, and goods and services and, international trade and transactions while small 
states had high dependence on the latter.  Therefore, these three taxes remained popular 
among developing countries.  Overall, the analytical results indicated a more buoyant tax 
system for very large nations.  These findings were consistent with earlier studies.   
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The results from the Panel DOLS procedure indicated statistical significance for 
population, consumption-share of current GDP, investment-share of current GDP, and 
per capita income in determining tax capacity for developing countries.  The coefficient 
on the variable of interest, population, suggested that largeness is associated with higher 
tax-to-GDP ratios.  Evidence showed that an increase in per capita income lead to a 
decline in tax capability.  Though the coefficient on openness was positive, it was 
statistically insignificant.  This was unexpected since it was observed that small 
economies concentrated on international trade.  Therefore, the questions asked were: why 
no relationship existed between openness and tax capacity, given that microstates had 
higher tax-to-GDP ratios and high concentration on international trade, and if so, how can 
they still be able to raise higher tax revenues with respect to income than large nations?  
The only relatable answer was efficient tax administration that can be attributable to 
better political conditions and less corruption.  In this study, the findings for the empirical 
investigation were given more weight thus being the preferred method. 
 
The findings presented above naturally lead to several implications and recommendations 
to assist countries with effective policy making.  The results fortified the vulnerable state 
of micro countries in a globalized world as their size puts them in a disadvantaged 
position in the generation of additional tax revenues.  Therefore, microstates are more 
susceptible to fall-offs in tax revenues as a result of shocks to the economy.  This may 
encourage external borrowing by the government in order to meet public expenditure that 
in turn worsens the budget deficit.  Consequently, the government needs to lower tax 
concentration and diversify their tax structure. 
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Based on the results, maxi-states have more flexibility in adopting any public sector 
approach.  Whenever faced with the problem of finding revenue to finance increased 
expenditures, the spend-tax hypothesis can be used without creating major adversities on 
their economies.  On the other hand, it would be more prudent for a microstate 
government to practice the tax-spend hypothesis, that is, raise revenue first and then 
allocate to expenditure.  This approach will alleviate any potential budget deficits that 
may become detrimental to the growth of the economy.  Therefore, policy makers are 
provided with information that could assist them in fiscal decision-making. 
 
To help improve tax-to-GDP ratios in maxi-states, the study recommends that very large 
nations should educate the taxpayers on the benefits that both society and the taxpayer 
may receive.  If individuals are aware of the purposes of taxation, this may abate the 
possibility of evading or avoiding taxes.  To address the inefficiencies due to internal 
conflicts and corruption, the government can assign tax administrators to different 
constituencies instead of having one large body being responsible for collecting tax 
revenues.  Further research can be undertaken to weigh the costs and benefits of such a 
decision. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: List of Micro and Very Large Countries 
 
Country 
Microstate Maxi-state 
Antigua and Barbuda Algeria 
Comoros Angola 
Dominica Cameroon 
Grenada Chile 
Kiribati Cote d‟Ivoire 
Kuwait Ecuador 
Maldives Iran 
Samao Iraq 
Sao Tome & Principe Kazakhstan 
Seychelles Kenya 
St. Kitts and Nevis Morocco 
St. Lucia Nigeria 
St. Vincent Grenadines Pakistan 
Tonga Peru 
Vanuatu Saudi Arabia 
 Sudan 
 Ukraine 
 Uzbekistan 
 Venezuela 
 Vietnam 
 Yemen 
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Table 2A: Percentage of Countries using Individual Tax Groups (Averages) 
 
Tax Category Ministates 
(percent) 
Maxistates 
(percent) 
Taxes on income, profit and capital gains 91.7 100 
       Individual 75 94.1 
       Corporate 91.7 100 
       Unallocated 8.3 70.6 
   
Taxes on Payroll and workforce 0 35.3 
   
Taxes on Property 83.3 58.8 
       Recurrent taxes on immovable property   
       Recurrent taxes on net wealth   
       Estate, inheritance, and gift taxes   
       Taxes on financial and capital transaction   
       Other non-recurrent taxes on property   
       Other recurrent taxes on property   
   
Taxes on goods and services 91.7 100 
       General taxes on goods and services 83.3 82.3 
       Excises 58.3 100 
       Profits of fiscal monopolies 0 23.5 
       Taxes on specific services 66.7 35.3 
       Taxes on use of goods or permission to use 
goods 
75 47.1 
       Other taxes on goods and services 33.3 41.2 
   
Taxes on international trade and transactions 100 100 
       Customs and other import duties 91.7 100 
       Taxes on exports 41.7 64.7 
       Profits of export or import monopolies 0 11.8 
       Exchange profits 0 17.6 
       Exchange taxes 41.7 5.9 
       Other taxes 33.3 35.3 
   
Other taxes 58.3 100 
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Table 2B: Tax Revenue/GDP Ratio 
 
Tax category Mini-state Maxi-state 
Income, profits and capital gains 5.2 7.24 
Payroll and workforce 0 0.54 
Property 0.3 0.4 
Goods and services 4 8.1 
International trade and transactions 11.9 5.6 
Other  0.8 0.6 
   
Total Tax Revenue 24.1 10.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2C: Tax Concentration Ratios 
 
Tax Category Sources of tax revenue 
 Mini-states Maxi-states 
Income, profits and capital gains 20.4 36.3 
Payroll and workforce 0 2.2 
Property 1.3 2.7 
Goods and services 17.4 32.4 
International trade and transactions 58.1 22.2 
Other  2.3 3.5 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 
Table 3A: Panel Unit Root Test Results 
 
Variable LLC Breitung IPS ADFF Hadri Decision 
LTAX -0.315 
(0.376) 
-3.121 
(0.001)*** 
-2.1097 
(0.017)** 
8.176 
(0.0168)** 
8.048 
(0.000)*** 
I(0) 
LTAX -46.967 
(0.000)*** 
   -1.116 
(0.868) 
 
LPOP 0.0298 
(0.512) 
-1.442 
(0.075)* 
-0.047 
(0.481) 
1.464 
(0.4808) 
9.555 
(0.000)*** 
I(1) 
LPOP -46.976 
(0.000)*** 
-24.125 
(0.000)*** 
-28.628 
(0.000)*** 
254.672 
(0.000)*** 
-0.323 
(0.627) 
 
LCS -3.392 
(0.0003)*** 
-1.159 
(0.123) 
-3.044 
(0.0012)** 
13.073 
(0.0014)** 
4.389 
(0.000)*** 
I(0) 
LCS  -13.861 
(0.000)*** 
  -0.035 
(0.514) 
 
LIS -0.547 
(0.292) 
-0.920 
(0.179) 
-0.798 
(0.212) 
3.198 
(0.202) 
7.766 
(0.000)*** 
I(1) 
LIS -23.86 
(0.000)*** 
-1.69 
(0.046)** 
-18.350 
(0.000)*** 
174.82 
(0.000)*** 
-0.905 
(0.8171) 
 
LYpc 0.519 
(0.698) 
-0.422 
(0.337) 
0.3089 
(0.621) 
0.914 
(0.633) 
8.89 
(0.000)*** 
I(1) 
LYpc -42.058 
(0.000)*** 
-14.779 
(0.000)*** 
-27.483 
(0.000)*** 
241.43 
(0.000)*** 
0.7013 
(0.2415) 
 
LOP -2.064 
(0.0195)** 
1.330 
(0.908) 
-2.355 
(0.0093)*** 
9.440 
(0.009)*** 
6.4415 
(0.000)*** 
I(0) 
LOP -28.134 
(0.000)*** 
-7.927 
(0.000)*** 
  0.3063 
(0.379) 
 
Notes: *** indicates significance at 1 percent; ** indicates significance at 5 percent; * indicates 
significance at 10 percent. Figures in parenthesis are the probability values. 
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Table 3B: Pedroni Panel Co-integration Test Results 
 
 Within Dimension (Panel 
Statistics) 
Between Dimension (Group 
Statistics) 
Statistics No 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
No 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
V 24.904 
(0.000)*** 
25.027 
(0.000)*** 
-19.799 
(0.000)*** 
   
Rho -20.821 
(0.000)*** 
-19.011 
(0.000)*** 
-16.316 
(0.000)*** 
-21.978 
(0.000)*** 
-18.755 
(0.000)*** 
-15.084 
(0.000)*** 
PP -15.008 
(0.000)*** 
-14.039 
(0.000)*** 
-13.022 
(0.000)*** 
-17.582 
(0.000)*** 
-15.232 
(0.000)*** 
-13.178 
(0.000)*** 
ADF -12.211 
(0.000)*** 
-12.013 
(0.000)*** 
-10.994 
(0.000)*** 
-13.978 
(0.000)*** 
-12.795 
(0.000)*** 
-10.888 
(0.000)*** 
Notes:  *** indicates significance at 1 percent; ** indicates significance at 5 percent; * indicates 
significance at 10 percent.  Figures in parenthesis are the probability values. 
 
Table 3C: Panel Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares Estimation Results for the 
Dependent Variable, TAX  
 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Standard Error 
LPOP 0.538 2.410 0.223 
LCS 0.531 3.614 0.147 
LIS 0.761 3.983 0.191 
LYpc -1.003 -4.590 0.219 
    
R
2
 = 0.738 
Adj. R
2
 = 0.738 
Prob(F-statistic) = 0.000 
 
